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Abstract—OS compromise is one of the most serious computer 
security problems today, but still not being resolved. Although 
people proposed different kinds of methods, they could not be 
accepted by most users who are non-expert due to the lack of 
compatibility and usability. In this paper, we introduce a kind of 
new mandatory access control model, named CUMAC, that aims 
to achieve good-enough security, high compatibility and usability. 
It has two novel features. One is access control based on tracing 
potential intrusion that can reduce false negatives and facilitate 
security configuration, in order to improve both compatibility 
and usability; the other is automatically figuring out all of the 
compatibility exceptions that usually incurs incompatible 
problems. The experiments performed on the prototype show 
that CUMAC can defense attacks from network, mobile disk and 
local untrustable users while keeping good compatibility and 
usability. 
Keywords- AccessControl;Compatibility;Usability 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004 the USA Today reported that hackers were selling 
computing time on large networks of compromised machines, 
which are believed to be used for activities such as online 
extortion, delivering unsolicited email advertisements, and 
identity theft through fraudulent web sites. Some valuable 
security countermeasures, such as antivirus software, network 
Firewalls, and antispyware software, may deal with this 
problem. However, the F.B.I. conducted a survey of U.S. 
businesses, which found that 87% of the companies surveyed 
experienced at least one computer security compromise in 2005, 
and most of these companies use those security 
countermeasures to prevent compromises. This evidence shows 
that the current state-of-the-art in computer security defenses 
does not prevent all security compromises. 
To solve the problem, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is 
a good choice, which can restrict privileged processes so that 
damage resulting from compromise is limited. Over the last 30 
years, many projects have demonstrated useful MAC features 
on operating systems. Recent examples include DTE [1], 
LOMAC [2], Security-Enhanced Linux [3] and UMIP [4]. 
However, despite their success, these demonstrations have 
some problems hesitating non-expert users to accept them. For 
example, the policy interface of SELinux is daunting even for 
security experts [4]; the recent UMIP demonstrating a usable 
mandatory integrity protection in OS kernel still suffers the 
problem of “self revocation”[2] that downgrades its 
compatibility. 
This paper presents our novel form of access control, 
Compatible and Usable Mandatory Access Control (CUMAC), 
which aims to prevent system compromise in a both 
compatible and usable manner so as to tackles the OS 
compromise problem. It is designed to meet three specific 
goals. First, good-enough security, i.e. CUMAC can prevent 
remote or local attackers from taking over a host, but is not 
required to reach a higher level of security than necessary as 
well. Second, high compatibility, i.e. CUMAC must be 
compatible with the existing deployed Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) software. This goal implies that CUMAC should 
not require the replacement or modification of existing 
software and its configurations in order to operate smoothly, as 
well as not cause failures in the working software. Third, high 
usability, i.e. CUMAC must be largely transparent to the user. 
This goal implies that the user should not be required to learn 
new behaviors in order to work in a CUMAC-enhanced 
environment, and configuring a CUMAC should be an 
automatic progress. 
The basic CUMAC policy is as follows: Each process and 
file has two states, which are either potential intrusion or non-
intrusion. From each potential intrusion entrance in OS, 
CUMAC labels the relevant processes and executable-files as 
potential intrusion. Tracing the activities of these processes or 
processes derived from the potential intrusion files, CUMAC 
labels the processes they forked and communicated with as 
potential intrusion, as well as labels the executable-files they 
created or modified as potential intrusion. When potential 
intrusion processes request to launch security critical 
operations, CUMAC refuses them so as to prevent possible 
host compromise. 
Comparing with previous MAC systems, CUMAC has two 
novel features. One is access control based on tracing potential 
intrusion. As most of the traditional MAC systems require 
manually configuring entity labels, the biggest advantage of 
tracing potential intrusion is to label OS entities automatically. 
Meanwhile, access control based on tracing potential intrusion 
can reduces false negatives that are the root cause of 
incompatibility in a MAC enforced system. The other novelty 
is to automatically figure out all compatibility exceptions 
usually incurring incompatibility problems by a carefully 
designed mechanism. For most of the MAC policies, 
compatibility exception is inevitable and difficult to be found 
out. However, so far rare research has focused on this issue. 
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Especially, we do not find any research on the automated 
compatibility exception handling mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents our considerations before construct the model. Section 
3 describes the basic CUMAC model and exception 
mechanism. Section 4 discusses its prototype and tests on 
Linux. We present related works and make a conclude in 
Section 5. 
II. CONSIDERATIONS 
Before presenting the model, the goals of the model should 
be analyzed deeply in order to find out proper ways to achieve 
them. 
A. Good-enough Security 
Sandhu [1] observed that “cumbersome technology will be 
deployed and operated incorrectly and insecurely, or perhaps 
not at all.” and suggested the following adaptation for the 
information security business: “Everything should be made as 
secure as necessary, but not securer.” This is the essence of 
good-enough information security. In the other words, good-
enough security requires that security in a manner that tradeoff 
security for other competing concerns. 
From the perspective of OS, good-enough security means 
necessary security along with good compatibility and usability. 
Since the most serious security problem in OS is compromise, 
the necessary security in OS would be prevention of it. As 
hundreds of thousands of computers managed by users without 
any knowledge in system security, one thus needs a security 
protection system with a high level of usability. On the other 
hand, no compatibility no usability, usability is based on 
compatibility. For instance, there is no sense to discuss the 
usability of a web server if it even cannot run smoothly. So, the 
protection mechanism should tradeoff security for both 
compatibility and usability while compatibility is prior to 
usability.  
Therefore, our objective is to build a system compatible 
with existing COTS software and easy to be configured, while 
greatly increases security level by narrowing the attack 
channels. However, we do not aim to provide a protection 
system with theoretically very strong security guarantees, 
whereas at the same time it is incompatible with existing 
applications and requires huge effort to configure it correctly. 
B. Compatibility 
Traditional MAC models, e.g. BLP, BIBA, DTE, can offer 
high security to OS through proper configuration. On the other 
hand, they also bring incompatibility into OS, causing many 
application failures [1] [2]. As a result, there are limitations 
when applying them to build a system with both high security 
and compatibility. 
From the perspective of intrusion detection, the 
incompatibility of traditional MAC comes from false negative, 
i.e. refusing the accesses that should be allowed, which leads to 
disturbing applications’ running on the OS. For example, the 
self-revocation problem [2] in Low-Water-Mark model is a 
typical false negative, refusing a process to write a file created 
by the process if it has read a lower level file before writing. 
From the perspective of intrusion detection, the write operation 
should not be refused if the lower level file actually does not 
contain harmful data. Another example of typical false negative 
is the shared /tmp directory [1] on a BLP enforced OS. 
According to BLP model, a process with different sensitive 
level or category can not write or read the entire system shared 
/tmp directory. From the perspective of intrusion detection, the 
process does not necessarily represent an intruder so that the 
read or write operation should not be simply refused. Since 
there are much more similar shared entities on OS such as 
shared files, devices, pipes and memory, these shared entities 
will make lots of software abnormally fail.  
However, the false negative is an inherent defect in the 
traditional MAC models. Because, traditional MAC makes 
access decision based on the labels of subject and object that 
are usually static or limitedly dynamic. As a result, MAC 
cannot change the labels dynamically to reflect intrusion 
progress in OS, i.e. identify intrusion entities in OS. In other 
words, MAC cannot correctly recognize intrusion entities and 
non-intrusion entities at the time to make access decision. 
Therefore, MAC often fails to make correct access decisions in 
order to avoid false negatives. 
Thereby, we know how to improve the compatibility of an 
access control model. That is to dynamically change the subject 
and object labels according to the intrusion spread progress in 
OS. 
C. Usability 
On other side, traditional MAC also can not provide good 
usability to general users due to requiring complicated 
configuration and usage method different from convention. In 
modern OS, as there are wide kinds of entities including user, 
process, file, directory, device, pipe, signal, shared memory 
and socket, etc, it is difficult for a general user to correctly 
configure labels for all entities without leaving security 
vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, after enforcing MAC, users must 
break their usage convention and learn how to use MAC. 
Consequently, the ideal way for access control model to 
provide good usability is automatically initializing and 
changing labels of entities and saving them through 
conventional security mechanisms user familiar with.  
From the perspective of defeating intrusion, only two types 
of labels, i.e. intrusion and non-intrusion, are necessary. Thus, 
automatic label initialization and change can be achieved by 
tracing and identifying intrusion entities. 
III. CUMAC MODEL 
Though the description of CUMAC model is based on the 
design for Linux/Unix OS, we believe that the model is also 
suitable for non-Unix operating systems such as the Microsoft 
Windows family with specific changes. Investigating the 
applicability of CUMAC for Microsoft Windows is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
A. Intrusion Analysis 
According to the analysis above, improving both capability 
and usability of an access control model needs to trace 
intrusions in OS so as to automatically set security label for OS 
entities, i.e. identifying intrusion entities. Usually, intrusions on 
OS consist of three phases: intrusion entrance, intrusion spread 
and security critical operation.  
Intrusion entrance represents an entry point through which 
intruder gets access to OS, for example, communicating with 
remote host. Conservatively, any session on OS steming from 
such type of entrances should be considered as potential 
intrusion. In other words, the processes belonging to such 
session and files modified by these processes also should be 
considered as potential intrusion. 
Security critical operation represents operations through 
which intruder can illegally compromise the system and read 
sensitive information, including system privileged operations, 
writing system important executable and configuration files, as 
well as reading files containing secrecies. In most cases, 
security critical operation is the target or necessary step of an 
intrusion. Without successfully performing the planned security 
critical operation, an intrusion can not achieve its goals. 
Consequently, access control mechanism must prevent any 
potential intrusion process from executing security critical 
operation in order to protect whole system. 
Intrusion spread represents intrusion steps from intrusion 
entrance to security critical operation. These steps can be 
uncovered by the method analyzing OS level information flow, 
which is proposed and verified by recent years’ research 
projects [8][9][10]. 
B. Model Description 
Corresponding to the three phases of intrusion on OS, the 
CUMAC model is comprised of intrusion entrance, intrusion 
spread and security critical operations, as well as protection 
rules used to prevent potential intrusion process from executing 
security critical operations. Figure 1 shows the basic phases of 
the CUMAC model.  
Firstly, CUMAC traces potential intrusion from three types 
of possible intrusion entrances, involving communicating with 
remote host, mounting mobile storage and untrustable user 
login. Obviously, communicating with remote host is the most 
frequently exploited way by intruders. Meanwhile, mounting 
mobile storage also can introduce malware into system due to 
the mobile storage might contain malware from other 
compromised machine. Finally, local untrustable user can 
upgrade him as super user through specific local attack. 
Consequently, CUMAC treat following three entities as the 
start points for tracing potential intrusion: 
 Processes conducted remote communication; 
 Executable files copied from a mounted mobile storage; 
 Processes coming from the login of an untrustable user. 
Secondly, CUMAC traces intrusion spreading activities in 
OS by employing OS level information flow analysis method 
[8] [9] [10]. It flags following entities as potential intrusion: 
 Processes spawned by a potential intrusion process; 
 Executable files created or modified by a potential 
intrusion process; 
 Processes communicated with a potential intrusion 
process; 
 Processes launched from a potential intrusion file. 
Lastly, CUMAC blocks potential intrusion processes to 
perform security critical operations. There are three categories 
of security critical operations including: 
 System privileged operations that only can be executed 
by super user; 
 Write files requiring integrity protection, such as 
executable files and important configuration files; 
 Read files requiring sensitivity protection, such as files 
containing system secrecy or user’s secrecy. 
To improve usability, CUMAC uses existing security 
mechanism to recognize security critical operations. For Linux 
platform, CUMAC treats process capabilities as system 
privileged operations, treats files without “write” permission 
for other users as files requiring integrity protection, and treats 
files without “read” permission for other users as files requiring 
sensitivity protection. 
In summary, the basic CUMAC model works in this way: 
Each process and file has two states, which are either potential 
intrusion or non-intrusion. From each potential intrusion 
entrance in OS, CUMAC labels the relevant processes and 
executable-files as potential intrusion. Tracing the activities of 
these processes or processes derived from the potential 
intrusion files, CUMAC labels the processes they forked and 
communicated with as potential intrusion, as well as labels the 
executable-files they created or modified as potential intrusion. 
When potential intrusion processes request to launch security 
critical operations, CUMAC refuses them so as to prevent 
possible host compromise. 
C. Exception Mechanism 
With the CUMAC model presented above, computer 
compromise problem can be resolved. But yet there are some 
special accesses causing false negative, called exceptional 
access. Exceptional access is not intrusion but will be refused 
by access control mechanism and cause applications fail. For 
example, when super user tries to upgrade the system from 
remote machine, CUMAC will regard it as potential intrusion 
and then refuse him to over write executable files. Although 
our experiments showed that exceptional accesses amount to 
very little, an exception mechanism to deal with them is still 
appealed since CUMAC aims to achieve high compatibility 
and usability. Moreover, papers [4] [1] also pointed out the 
importance of exception mechanism. Nevertheless, so far there 
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Figure 1. CUMAC Model 
is rare research work focused on this topic, especially 
automatic exception mechanism. 
Usually, exception mechanism can be built as a type of 
white-list on which all exceptional accesses are recorded. But it 
is not feasible to be enforced on a system with many kinds of 
software installed, because user could not find out all 
exceptional accesses. Therefore, the ideal method is to 
automatically figure out all exceptional accesses.  
Concretely, we imagine the exception mechanism works in 
this way: in a secure environment that is sure no intrusion, 
exception mechanism automatically records and stores all the 
exceptional accesses that is refused by the access control 
mechanism into an exceptional access list; then, in an unsecure 
environment that might have intrusion, exception mechanism 
authorizes exceptional accesses according to the exceptional 
access list. 
In order to build up the exception mechanism, we 
performed some experiments from which two realities are 
uncovered. One is that each exceptional access is necessarily 
generated by certain application. In other words, every 
exceptional access belongs to a specific application. The other 
is that all exceptional accesses can be divided into two 
categories: privileged operation related exceptional access and 
file operation related exceptional access. 
Based on the analysis and experiment results above, we 
designed the exception mechanism. It has four basic elements 
as follows:  
(1) Key. Every application has a unique key to identify itself, 
which comes from the file node number of the 
application’s executable file. Any process started from an 
executable file will automatically inherit the key. 
Exception mechanism authorizes an exceptional access 
according to process’ key. 
(2) File Exceptional Access List. Every file or directory has 
such a list and stores it in the file node as a security 
property. Every item of the list is a pair containing a key 
and a vector recording permitted access modes to the file 
or directory. In other words, the item actually describes 
which application can perform what kinds of accesses to 
the file or directory. 
(3) Privilege Exceptional Access List. Every application 
has such a list and stores it in executable file’s file 
node as security property. Every item of the list 
represents a privilege the application owns. 
Processes of the application will inherit the 
privileges from its executable file. 
(4) Environment Bit. There is only one such a bit for the 
entire system to mark the running environment of 
the system. As presented above, in a secure 
environment, exception mechanism records 
exceptional accesses into the two exceptional access 
lists described above; in an unsecure environment, 
exception mechanism authorizes exceptional access 
according to the two lists. Usually, the bit is set by 
system administrator. 
The work flow of the exception mechanism is 
depicted in Figure 2. When the system is running with 
the bit value representing secure environment, all the 
accesses that should be refused by access control mechanism 
are permitted and recorded into the two lists as exceptional 
accesses. When the system is running with the bit value 
representing unsecure environment, for each accesses refused 
by access control mechanism, exception mechanism will 
further check if it is an exceptional access recorded in the two 
lists, and permit it if it is an exceptional access. 
IV. PROTOTYPE 
To verify the capability of CUMAC model to effectively 
prevent host compromise while keeping high compatibility and 
usability, we implemented a CUMAC prototype in Linux 
kernel 2.6.9 through the means of Linux Security Module 
(LSM). 
A. Implementation 
The CUMAC implementation consists of three parts: 
decision, exception and information. The decision part handles 
access requests intercepted from system calls. When making a 
decision, it firstly reads the CUMAC attributes of subject and 
object from information part, and then decides whether to 
permit the access and whether to modify the CUMAC 
attributes according to the CUMAC model rules presented at 
section 3.2. In the case of denying the access, the decision part 
will try to forward the access request to the exception part to 
check if the access is an exception. The information part 
maintains CUMAC attributes in memory, containing key, 
potential intrusion flags and exceptional access lists. The whole 
implementation is encapsulated in a LSM, and does not impose 
any modifications on the Linux kernel code, thus it is highly 
compatible with Linux kernel. 
B. Evaluation 
In order to experimentally evaluate the CUMAC model, we 
established two servers configured with Fedora Core 3 whose 
kernel version is 2.6.9, and loaded our LSM module during 
system boot. We tested the CUMAC prototype from four 
dimensions: compatibility, usability, security, and performance.  
High compatibility requires that existing deployed COTS 
software can run on the CUMAC prototype without significant 
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Figuire 2. Exception Mechanism Working Flow 
incompatibility problems. On the two servers deployed, we 
installed many commonly used network applications and local 
applications e.g. apache, mysql, samba, ftp, telnet, mozilla, 
dhcp, sendmail, KDE desktop, open office, webmin, ssh, yum, 
etc. Then, we used them to send mails, go on Internet, install 
software remotely, share files remotely, manage user accounts 
remotely and move file by USB disk. The system works well 
for the last four months, without modifications of existing 
software and running failures.  
Usability need to be evaluated from two aspects including 
the amount of configuration work and the impaction on user’s 
convention. The configuration work of CUMAC is only to set 
the environment bit, and all other CUMAC information is 
automatically configured. The running and configuration of 
CUMAC is transparent to users who thus only need to manage 
traditional DAC mechanism. 
To verify the functionality of security protection, we carried 
out three experiments including defeating intrusion from USB 
disk, local untrustable user and network. First, we run a rootkit 
named adore-ng-2.6 from a mounted USB disk, trying to install 
a kernel module. The CUMAC module then refuses the insmod 
request that usually is a critical operation to control the whole 
system. Second, we login the system with a non-administration 
account and invoke ptrace to exploit a race condition so as to 
cause the target kernel to hang. The CUMAC successfully 
refuses the user to execute ptrace function. Third, we download 
a rootkit named knark [11] through Mozilla web browser and 
try to run it. CUMAC then successfully blocks its operation to 
install a kernel module. 
In addition, CUMAC has little impact on Linux 
performance. First, the decision are simple as they only 
compare flags of the subject and object; second, getting 
decision data is also fast in that potential intrusion flags are 
stored in the security field of the concerned kernel data 
structures. In the performance test, we compared the 
performance of two kernels: the original Linux kernel and the 
CUMAC-enforced kernel. This test uses “kernel compile” [29] 
as test method, a broadly accepted method for testing the 
general performance of Linux. The result shows that CUMAC-
enforced Linux kernel only imposes 2.1% performance 
overhead comparing to the original Linux kernel. 
Based on the above tests, we can safely say that the 
CUMAC-enforced Linux can block system compromise 
operations while keeping high compatibility and usability, as 
well as incur trifle performance overhead. 
V. RELATED WORK AND SUMMARY 
There are two most related works, i.e. UMIP and LOMAC. 
UMIP evolves from BIBA model while aims to add usable 
mandatory integrity access control to operating system. But it 
suffers several shortcomings. First, it can not address the self-
revocation problem that is an inherent defect in BIBA model so 
that still has incompatibility problem. Second, it requires user 
to manually figure out all exceptional accesses, thus fail to 
offer perfect usability to general user. Third, it confuses low 
integrity level with potential intrusion so that fails to trace 
intrusion when low integrity level processes write low integrity 
level files. Lastly, it only can defense attack from network. 
Similar to UMIP, LOMAC also try to introduce a type of 
mandatory integrity protection mechanism in OS while 
compatible with widespread commercial software. But it also 
suffers self-revocation problem and can not automatically 
configure security labels. 
Comparing with these two projects, CUMAC is a type of 
novel access control, providing high compatibility, usability 
and good enough security protection to user. It employs two 
novel methods. One is tracing intrusion to automatically flag 
potential intrusion entities in order to prevent potential 
intrusion processes from executing security critical operations. 
The other is automatically figuring out exceptional accesses so 
as to eliminate compatibility exceptions. In short, CUMAC is a 
new access control model performing access control based on 
tracing potential intrusion. Test results show that CUMAC can 
defeat attacks from mobile disk, untrustable user and network 
by refusing their requests to perform security critical operation 
that results in whole system compromise, while offer high 
compatibility to COTS software and high usability to ordinary 
users. 
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